M.L. NATTAKORN DEVAKULA
At first instance the answer is not hard to figure out. It is Pakistan which is worse, politically speaking that is.
With the continuing mess over there involving street protests as well as the combined recent explosions which killed over 130 people, the South Asian nation is facing the tough task of having to handle a president whose powers extend beyond the normal limitations of a head of state, a judiciary out of control sending lawyers to protest with alternative political agendas, fundamentalist Islamic terrorists plotting the next attack on Islamabad, growing Western ties via US-leaning politicians like former prime minister Benazir Bhutto...
Comparatively, however, the developing democracies of Pakistan and Thailand are similar in many aspects. Here's why:
Corruption is the ultimate claim in ushering in military rule and the consequent sweeping out of elected administrations.
This is the very rationale used by General Pervez Musharraf when he delivered the surprise ousting of popularly elected Nawaz Sharif.
As well, General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin opted for corruption as one of the four reasons behind the Sept 19, 2006 power grab.
To go even further back, the corruption card has been used in nearly every single coup d'etat in the history of the Thai kingdom. In this sense, Thailand may actually be worse.
If there is a contrast here, it is that most coup leaders in Thai history have also resorted to the accusation of lese-majeste, proven or unproven, against the elected government leaders, to lay additional legitimacy upon an extra-constitutional intervention.
Pakistan does lack this aspect. Yet, a comparable factor may be the claims by many Pakistani strongmen against elected leaders for selling out national interests to Western nations and companies.
This is often used by Pakistani coup leaders to oust democratically-elected prime ministers.
Politicians who tend to favour military officials upon learning that there will be a coup (and realising the fact that after the coup they stand a chance of coming into power), tend to exact opportunities wisely.
This is a recurring phenomenon in both countries. Benazir Bhutto fits this particular mould. Had it not been for the emergency decree, she would already be running to join the administration of the then only president-elect Gen Pervez Musharraf.
Negotiations with military powers-that-be are essential for the political survival of politicians whose intention is not to stand up for revolutionary democratic change. Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party is analogous to a political party in Thailand which cowers down to those top boots. This is not to place blame on any of the participants, for what is at hand is rather a systemic transnational obstacle to democratic evolution, rather than a specific single-country problem.
The future downfall of the nation may partly originate from the fact that the judiciary branch has been brought in to engage in political activity.
In Pakistan, street protesters asking for President Musharraf's resignation comprise lawyers and judges. The now former Supreme Court Justice was a focal point of the Musharraf opposition; politically he was seen as a new candidate to lead Pakistan.
Unions representing lawyers, judges and professionals within the legal community have called for a regime change. They also resorted to practically every means - nearly extra-constitutional - to remove their president. Their last aim was to strip President Musharraf of his electoral victory by disqualifying him ex-post. The role of the judiciary was, and still is, too expansive.
Similarly in Thailand, judges have become too powerful. Making decisions and delivering verdicts in cases of political consequence paves the way for the judiciary to be a "party" to political activity. The glut of cases at the Administrative Court on privatisation issues, on public officials' removal, and on an annoyingly large number of executive branch-realm powers, can disrupt a balanced function of the branches.
Further, the BE 2550 Constitution grants judges the power to take part in the selection and removal of members of independent agencies.
One of the few elements that separate Thailand from Pakistan when it comes to judges is that at least here they do not go out to rally for regime change. If the kingdom keeps going down this route, however, that may change. Who or what is to blame for this?
It can be stated unequivocally that Pakistan's stability faces a much graver threat from terrorist forces than Thailand's. National security in this nuclear power is at stake when it comes to their current fight against a growing al-Qaeda.
Thailand's southern provinces face a similar thorn, but at least the capital Bangkok has yet to be gripped with fighting the virulent plague of transnational Western ideology-hating extremists. Barring this particular latter point, the politics of that South Asian nation and our Land of Smiles have more in common than in contrast. Politicians are elected to operate the engine that is the executive branch. Then, in turn, they become corrupt and are ousted, beginning with street protests then later with an armed power grab. Consequentially, the extension of power follows either overtly through a self-proclaimed presidency, or a superficial electoral referendum.
The extension of power can also be followed by constitutionally-embedded provisions and agenda-framing propaganda in order to perpetuate recurring technocrat-military alliance duumvirate leaderships.
A final curtain closes with a politically-engaged judiciary branch forever linked to decisions that shape government policy and dictate the fate of politicians.
If Thailand's democracy is not going to evolve, at least we know we will have a friend.
The writer is a news analyst.
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